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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GERALD JENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 8369

FRANK F. MOWER,
Def.endant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
rrhis action was brought by the plaintiff, who was
injured on February 2, 1954, at approximately 6:30A.M.
(Tr. 14), during total darkness '(Tr. 45), while riding in
defendant's automobile. Plaintiff and defendant were
fellow employees of the Hill Air Force Base and were
en route from their homes in Salt Lake City to their
employment at the time of the accident.
We respectfully refer the Court to the photograph

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the blackboard (Appendix 1), which photograph was
taken imn1ediately following the trial, for clarification of
the fallowing :
·The accident occurred in open country, two 1niles
North of the Farmington Underpass on U.S. #91 (Tr. 7),
and 4/10th of a mile North of Shepard's Lane, Davis
County, Utah (Tr. 9). The scene is a one way (Tr. 9; 1-!)
two-lane highway, black top (Tr. 8; 9) running Northerly
frmn the Underpass (Tr. 9). The entire width of the
highway is 38 feet and has no shoulders (Tr. 10; 13).
The right or East lane is 22 feet wide (Tr. 11; 13) and the
West or left lane is 12 feet wide (Tr. 12; 13). Four feet
inside or East of the West edge of the road are painted
twc. lines, indicating no crossing over, due to a "barrow
pit" which separates the North traffic lanes from the
South traffic lanes (Tr. 9; 10; 13). This "barrow pit"
or gulley is 3 to 4 feet deep ( Tr. 10; 14) and varies in
width between the two highways from 10 to 25 feet ( Tr.
9; 10; 14). At the point of impact, the "barrow pit" was
about 15 feet wide ('Tr. 9; 14). The two lanes for Northbound traffic was separated by a painted line ('Tr. 10).
East of the highway it also drops off into a ''barrow pit"
(Tr.13;35).
The n1orning of the accident was cold (Tr. 22) and
foggy '(Tr. 16), but the highway was clear of snow (Tr.
43; 44). It had not snowed in the area for 7 to 10 days
(Tr. 156). The defendant's testimony was that the appearance of the highway was misleading, as it appeared
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3
to be dry, and two other drivers of Northbound vehicles,
inYolved in accidents at the scene immediately following
the accident to the defendant's vehicle, also so testified.
However, the evidence was conflicting on the appearance
of the highway, other witnesses testifying that the highway appeared icy.
The surface of the road was, in fact, covered with
a sheet of ice at the scene of the accident (Tr. 41), and
the testimony was in dispute as to how far South of the
scene of the accident the icy condition of the road extended (T·r. 32). The thin layer of ice was apparently deposited by the fog, coupled with the cold night (Tr. 15;
43).
Prior to the accident, David E. l{enley, also an employee of Hill Air Force Base, was driving his black or
blue 1942 Buick automobile in a Northerly direction in
the outside lane of this one-way highway (Tr. 131; 132).
He testified that at the Underpass fog had started to
cloud up his windshield (Tr. 132) to the extent that he
could not see. The evidence was clear that Mr. Kenley
stopped his car squarely in the center of the East or
right lane of travel ( Tr. 26; 29) for the purpose of
scraping the fog off his windshield (Tr. 33). After
stopping, he had alighted from his car and had scraped
his 'vindshield. When he stopped, he noticed that his
car skidded on the ice (Tr. 134). He intended to scrape
the ice off and get back in his car before another car
came along (Tr. 133; 134).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

The defendant was proceeding Northerly in the East
or right lane of travel, in the fog and darkness, at a speed
testified by him at 30-35 MPI-I (Tr. 158), and variously
estimated by his passengers at 30-40 MPI-I (Tr. 117; 123).
After passing under the Farmington Underpass and
proceeding Northerly to a position approaching the
scene of the accident, he observed tail lights of a
vehicle ahead (Tr. 158). l-Ie at first thought that the
vehicle ahead was 1noving North. Mr. Gull, one of the
passengers riding in the front seat, also saw the tail
lights and had the same impression ('Tr. 102; 104). When
the defendant's car reached a distance of approximately
75 to 100 feet (Tr. 158) he realized that the car ahead
was stopped. The defendant, not being aware of the
reason for the car being stopped, in his testimony stated
"I wanted to slow up and see what was ahead" (Tr. 167;
173). The defendant turned his car to the left anid.
applied his brakes to slow down but not to stop (Tr.
159; 173), when the defendant's car immediately skidded
on the icy highway, with the result that the rear end
skidded to the North or to the car's right. The right rear
of the defendant's vehicle struck the left rear of the stopped Kenley vehicle (Tr. 25). The point of impact was

10 feet East of the broken white line separating the lanes
(Tr. 25). The impact caused the defendant to fall out of
the left door of his vehicle (Tr. 23; 167) onto the higkway,
after which the driverless car traveled through the "barrow pit" on its power, and across the South traffic lanes
and into a fence adjacent to a railroad right-of-way.
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David E. I~enley testified that the impact did not
shove his car at all (Tr. 135), but that after the accident
1\fr. I~enley drove his car to the East edge of the road
(Tr. 135).
To recite what then followed, as well as a brief review of the foregoing, we quote the testimony of Officer
Grant err. 29), whose resume of the entire accident was
as follows:
"The 1942 Buick (Kenley) had stopped in the
middle of the roadway. The 1947 Nash (Defendant) came driving along behind him, touched his
brakes, his car went into a skid sideways and hit
the rear end of the 1942 Buick and careened off on
the roadway to the left. The 1942 Buick went off
the roadway towards the East a little ways. While
that action was taking place there was another
car that came along."
''This car applied his brakes and Mr. Reynolds, who was following this unknown car, applied
his brakes when he saw the taillights of one of the
cars in front of him and he skidded sideways, hit
the car "X' as we shall say. ~Ir. Owens, following
Mr. Reynolds, also applied his brakes, skidded,
and hit into the rear of Mr. Reynold's car."
(Words in parentheses added.)
The facts with relation to the status of the plaintiff
in defendant's automobile, whether a guest or a passenger
for hire, is recjted fully at Page 17, Point One of thi~
Brief.
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The driver of the 1942 Buick, Mr. Kenley, was not
a party defendant to plaintiff's cause of action.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Appellant respectfully submits four points:
POINT ONE
THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESUMED BY LAW TO BE A
GUEST AND NOT A PASSENGER FOR HIRE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THAT PRESUMPTION.
POINT TWO
ASSUMING THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING
THE DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT, THE PLAINTIFF, ON
THOSE SAME FINDINGS WAS .CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THE JURY'S VERDICT
TO THE CONTRARY WAS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDE~CE.
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12 INVADED
THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY, AND WAS REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
POINT FOUR
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE PREJUDICIALLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY WERE CONTRADICTORY AND ·CONFUSING AND INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESUMED BY LAW TO BE A
GUEST AND NOT A PASSENGER FOR HIRE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
NE-CESSARY TO OVERCOME THAT PRESUMPTION.

Before reviewing the facts with relation to plaintiff's
status as a guest or passenger for hire, we respectfully
refer the Court to the following Statutes:
"41-9-2, UCA 1953 ... 'Guest' defined.- For
the purpose of this section the term 'guest' is hereby defined as being a person who accepts a ride
in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor."

Title 54, Chapter 6, UCA 1953, regulates the carrying of passengers for compensation on the highways of
this State.
''54-6-1, UCA 1953 . . . Words and phrases
defined. - 'Motor vehicle' means any automobile
. . . used upon any public highway of this state
for the purpose of transporting persons ... ".

" 'Common motor carrier of passengers'
means any person who holds himself out to the
public as willing to undertake for hire to transport
by motor vehicle from place to place, persons who
may choose to employ him."
"'Contract motor carrier of passengers'
means any person engaged in the transportation
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by n1otor vehicle of persons for hire, and not included in the tenn common motor carrier of passengers as hereinabove defined."
"54-6-3, UCA 1953 . . . 'transporting for
compensation on public highways.'

"No common or contract motor carrier shall
operate any motor vehicle for the transportation
of either persons or property for compensation on
any public highway in this state, except in accordance with the provisions of this act."
"54-6-12, UCA 1953 . . . 'Exceptions from
provisions of act.' No portion of this act shall
apply:

"(h) To a group of employees riding together in the automobile of a fellow employee to
and from their employment and sharing the actual
expenses of the transportation; provided that said
group of employees shall not exceed 5 persons, in
addition to the driver of the vehicle ... and provided further that this subsection shall not apply
to any individual so operating in excess of one
motor vehicle."
It shaU be unlawful for any vehicle which is
oper.ated under awy of said exempt classes to be
operated for any UAses or purposes no,t falling
within said exempt classes, except in ~accord(l;!fl(Je
with the p·rovisions of this act.
"54-6-18, UCA 195·3 ... violating provisions
of act a misdemeanor."
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lt will be noted, upon analyzing the above statutes,
that the Legislature uses the terms, "for hire" and "for
compensation" interchangeably. For exainple, in the
definitions of Common motor carrier of passengers, and
Contract motor carrier of passengers, the Legislature
has used the phrase "for hire", while in 54-6-3 (supra)
the Legislature, specifically referring to "common or
contract motor carriers", uses the term "for compensation".

However, before proceeding further with the analysis of the above statutory provisions in relation to the
facts of the case at bar, we feel it necessary to point out
to the Court a very obvious error, caused by oversight,
which occurred during the passage of suhsection (h)
54-6-12, V.C.A.1953 (then 76-5-25, U.C.A.1943 as Amended by Section 4 of Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945).
The error has to do with the Title to the above
Amendment as it now appears in Laws of Utah, 1948.
The House of Representatives Journal, 1948 Special
Session reveals that the above proposed Amendment was
introduced as H.B. No. 1, and the Title to the proposed
Amendment, as well as the proposed text were as follows:
"An act Amending (the above statute) By
Adding Thereto A Provision Permitting Casual
or Occasional Transportation of Persons F·or
Compensation By A Fellow Employee.
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(No portion of this Act shall apply:)
(h) To the casual or occasional transportation
'of persons for compensation by any person
not regularly engaged in transportation by
motor vehicle as his or its principal occupation or business, nor to the transportation of
not in excess of 5 persons in addition to the
driver of the vehicle to and from their daily
place's of employment by a fellow employee
not regularly engaged in transportation by
motor vehicle as his principal occupation or
business." (Original of H.B. No. 1 now in
Secretary of State's office.)
Concurrently with the action of the House in considering the above bill, the Senate introduced an identical
bill, ( S.B. No. 4, at page 9, Senate Journal, 1948) except
that the Title differed as follows:

"An Act Amending 8ection 76-5-26 (etc.) Relating To The Transportation of Persons And
Property By Motor Vehicle."
The House, after adopting some amendments to the
above text, which are not material here, pas·sed the bill
and forwarded it to the Senate.
The Senate referred the bill to its Judiciary Committee, and at page 43, Senate Journal, 1948, that ComInittee reported:
"We, your Committee on Judiciary beg leave
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to report that we have considered H.B. No. 1, by
Mrs. Ja0k, and in connection therewith we have
also considered S.B. No. 4, by Senators Selvin,
Midgley, Farr, Elggren and Knight; that the said
House and Senate Bills are identical; and that
after careful consideration of H. B. No. 1, we recommend that the said bill be amended by str'iking
all of Section "h" of the bill representing on page
2, lines 19 to 2'5 inclusive. In place thereof we
recommend the following language, to wit:
(h) To a group of employees riding together
in the automobile of a fellow employee to and from
their employment and sharing the actual expenses
of the transportation; provided that said group
of employees shall not exceed 5 persons, in addition to the driver of the vehicle, and in no event
to exceed 3 persons in any one seat, and provided
further that this subsection shall not apply to
any individual so operating in excess of one motor
vehicle."
On :March 8, 1948 the Senate passed the bill containing the ahove complete revision of the bill and returned
it to the House, who on the same day accepted the revision and passed the bill. During this fast action the
above mistake we refer to occurred. No one apparently
thought to also strike the language from the Title which
the Legislature had found objectionable, that is "casual
or occasional transportation for compensation."
It is clear, however, that for some very clear and
definite reason, the Legislature substituted the phrase
"sharing the actual expenses of the transportation" for
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the word '' con1pensation."
It seen1s ahnost superfluous to state that the Legis-

lature having found the language in the text objectionable, and having stricken it from the text, most certainly
intended also to strike it from the Title. Their failure to
so do can only be explained as an inadvertent oversight.
To now maintain that the Title, as it now appears in
Laws of Utah, 1948, despite the above mistake, clearly
expre'Sses the subject of the hill, would not only be
erroneous, but would leave the Aet open to valid attack
as unconstitutional, in violation of Article VI, Sec. 23,
Constitution of Utah. If, in fact, this Court cannot by
Judicial Interpretation, overlook and "strike" the words
in the Title, which the Legislature did in the text, and
thereby ignore the words "casual", '·'occasional", and
"for compensation", then we in fact contend that, in that
event, the Act as it now appears in Laws of Utah, 1948, is
unconstitutional. This for the re'a:son that the Act says
nothing about casual or occasional transportation, and
as we submit hereafter, it clearly infers from its text,
that the sharing of the actual expenses by the fellow employees shall not be deemed "compensation." The Title,
as it now appears, therefore, without the judicial interpretation which we have submitted, is in violation of the
Constitution, Article VI, Section 23.
The Title, however, can be amended to comply with
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the intent of the Legislature, by simply striking the words
found offensive by the Legislature in the text, but which
they failed to also strike from the Title, in which event
the Title would read:

''An Act Amending (the statute) By Adding
Thereto A Provision Permitting The Transportation of Persons By A F'ellow Employee."
As thus amended, in compliance with the intent of
the Legislature, the Title clearly expresses the subject
of the Act, and there could be no valid attack on constitutional grounds.
For the above reasons, we continue our analysis of
the statutes quoted at page 7 of thjs brief, in light with
the facts in the case at bar, and disregard the Title to
the Act.
The Legislature clearly decided in adopting the
exception to the Motor Vehicle Transportation Act, 54-612 (h) (supra) page 8, in effect that as long as the
fellow-employees were sharing the actual expenses of
the transportation, the driver-employee was not receiving "compensation" for the transportation; he was
not operating a vehicle "for hire", and the driver-employee therefore did not have to comply with the provisions of the act.
And conversely, if the driver-employee charged his
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fellow-employee riders more than their share of the actual expenses of the transportation, then the driverenlployee would be operating a vehiele ''for hire" or
·'for c01npensation", in which event he would be guilty
of a i\lisden1eanor, unless he fully complied with the other
provisions of the ~lotor Yehicle Transportation Act.

That interpretation is obvious, and not subject to
valid question, as the Legislature, following the list of
exceptions, stated, supra, page ______ :
"It shall be wnlawful for any vehicle which
is operated under any of said exempt classes to be
operated for any uses (sharing the actual expenses) or purposes (riding to and from employInent) not falling within said exempt classes,
exoept iJn accordance with the provisions of this
act." (parentheses and e1nphasis added)
Certainly it could not be suggested that the Legislature intended to limit the defendant here from bargaining for the best price possible as a fare to be charged his
fellow-employee riders; limit him strictly to accepting
from each e1nployee-rider his pro rata share of the actual
expenses of operating the defendant's own automobile;
expect the defendant to also pay his own share of the
expenses, inasmuch as the statutory· phrase is "sharing
the actual expenses"; and at the same time increase the
liability of the defendant to that of a person who operates
a vehicle for hire.
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1

rl hl' questio.n, then,

simply resolves itself into
whether the defendant charged the plaintiff more than
the plaintiff's share of the actual·expenses (in which ca;-;e
the plaintiff would be deemed a passenger for hire), or
whether the defendant charged the plaintiff his share
of thP artual expenses (in which event the plaintiff would
not be deemed a passenger for hire, but a mere guest,
and not entitled !o recover from the defendant.)
The burden .of proof, without question, was upon
the plaintiff to overcome the legal presumptions in favor
of the defendant, that the plaintiff was a g-uest, under
the statutes quoted above.
RIGGS YR. ROBERTS, (Idaho) 264 Pac. 2nd 698,
at page 703:
"Appellant did not sustain the burden of
proof resting on him to es.tahlish that such consideration passed to Respondent- for transportingAppellant on this trip as to make him a passenger,
not a guest."
HASBROOK VS. WINGATE, (Ohio) 10 ALR2134~
at page 1346 :
''Since the liability of the motorist host to a
person riding with him depends on the status of
the latter, he, the latter, has the burden to establish such relationship ... "
Vol. 9C, Blashfield, Cycl. of Auto. Law and Practice,
Sec. 6115, page 88:
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"Normally, when the vehicle is a private a~to
Inobile, not usually occupied as a common earner,
it is assurned that the occupants are gu·ests, and
it is incumbent upon the occupant to prove that
he is a passenger for hire."
And again at S.ec. 6146, page 16'5:
"Automobile guest statutes, widely prevalent
at the present time, preclude an injured guest
from recovering against the host for ordinary
negligence and for this or other reasons, the oecupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident
may seek to prove that he was not a guest, but on
the contrary had some status other than that co~
temp,lated by statrutes, and in this situation the
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff." (emphasis
adld~d)
-

In accord, see
JENKINS vs. NAT'IONAL PAINT & VAR·NISH CO., 7 Cal. App. 2nd 161, 61 Pac.
2nd 780;
PILCHE·R vs. ERNY, 155 Kan. 257, 124 Pac.
2nd 461;
MILLER vs. MILLER, 395 Ill. 273, 69 NE
2nd 878;
BURNS vs. 8TORCHAK, 331 Ill. App. 347,
73 NE 2nd 168.

The burden upon the plaintiff is even more apparent
when, as in the case at bar, the defendant is presumed by
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law to be acting legally within the provisions of the statutes heretofore cited, and the law will not presume tha•t
the defendant's act in accepting money from the plaintiff
for his transportation, is a violation of the statute.
20 Am. Juris., Evidence, Sec. 226, at page 221, states:
''The law presumes, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, that everyone obeys the law and discharges the duties imposed by law upon him, especially when a violation constitutes a criminal offense. It is presumed that the co:p.duct of men is
lawful ... and that they do not intend to violate
the law. Noncompliance with, or nonobservance
of, the statutory law ... will not be presumed."
A review of the testimony and evidence produced
by the plaintiff at the trial of this action, feU far short
of the evidence that would be necessary to sustain the
burden of proof requisite to even make the question one
of fact for the jury, let alone a ruling as a matter of law
in his favor. To sustain this proposition, we review in
detail, the entire testimony bearing on the status of the
plaintiff as a passenger for hire, or a guest.
(Tr. 2-5) The plaintiff first called the defendant,
Frank F. Mower, as an adverse witness under Rule 43,
URCP, and he testified that he lived at 1068 East 17th
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and had worked at the Hill
Air Force Base since June of 1953. He had driven his
car to work five days a week since working there. He
first became acquainted with the plaintiff, Mr. Jensen, on
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Tuesday qf ~the week prior to the accident and had,. prior
tq that time, carr:i~d fellow en1ployees back· and forth
with hin1 to I:Iill Field frmn Salt Lake City. Just before
he met plaintiff he had vacancies in his car for passengers.
(Tr. ·3)

"Q. ·And in line with
passengersf

that~ ·did

you _advertise for

a

A. Well,. they have bulletin board there that is
. , used especially for that. That is a regular
thing and if a person has vacancies why they
post a bulletin on this bulletin board and
. people that want. a ride can get in contact with

them."

·

·

.

.

The defendant te.stifie·d the notice said something to
the effect, "Riders from Salt Lake wanted," with his
name on it.
The day follo.wing t.he posting. of the notice, Mr.
Jensen, the plaintiff, came to the defendant and asked
the defendant if he had room for the plaintiff to ride and
the defendant replied "yes".
(Tr. 4) .

"Q. And what was said about the cost of the
transportation?
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A.

'There was nothing said about it. That was
more or less a standard thing. That was the
bus fare rate.

Q.

That was understood that he should pay you
for it?

A.

Yes. They all pay.

Q.

And did he pay you at all for any of his transportation?

A.

No. I don~t remember him ever paying anything.. He sent his boy down after you sent
me a letter to appear in Court to try to pay
me bu~ I ~idn't acce·pt it.

Q. But there were some arrangements made, I
take it, to pay you?
A.

Well, it was a standing idea that people wl10
ride are supposed to stand part of the expense."

The defendant testified that the plaintiff, during his
first ride with defendant, agreed to pay $3.50 per week,
and the payments would be made on pay day.
(Tr. 5)

"Q.

And was he to pay you that amount whether
he rode or not?

A.

Well, that was the standard bus arrangement.
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Q. Well, I take it he was supposed to pay you
whether he rode or not.
A.

'Well, he didn't pay me because he only rode
three days.

Q. But he agreed to pay you whether he rode or
not?
A. Yes.

Q. In other words, if he missed a day he was to
pay you?
A.

That would be the ge·neral idea."·

The plaintiff testified his address wa:s 46'6 E'ast 13th
South, Salt Lake City ('Tr. 69), and that (Tr. 70-72) he
was employed at Hill Air Force Base. On Tuesday or
Wednesday before the accident he went to the bulletin
board and observed the card with Mr. Mower's name on it
and contacted Mr. Mower.
(Tr. 71)
''I asked him if he still had room and he said
'yes' and he asked me where I lived and I told
him and he says that was good because that
'Would be on his route, he wouldn't have to go
out of the way to pick me up.
Q. And was anything said that time about
whether you were to pay him or not 1

A.

No.

I went back to work but when I asked
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him the first day I rotle with him, which was
Thursday, I asked him the11 how much and ...
he said 70c a ride and you pay Nhether you
go or not, as long as the car goes, and I told
him, 'okeh'."
On cross-examination (Tr. 94-96) the plaintiff further testified that he took another employee, Mr. Williams, to the defendant, inasmuch as Mr. Williams was
also seeking a ride. The bus fare from Salt Lake to
Hill Field and return was 70c per round trip, and that
was the amount he agreed to pay Mr. Mower, or 35c each
way. He had previously ridden with someone else who
had charged 90c for the same distance, and he did not
know what Mr. Mower was going to charge until he talked
to him. The plaintiff had previously driven hi·s own vehicle while his wife was also working at the Hill Air
Force Base, but discontinued driving because his wife
was laid off, his car needed overhauling, and further that
it was too e.'Cpensiv.e to drive his own car alone to and
from Hill Field. He had ridden with Mr. Mower, the
defendant, three days before the day of the accident
The defendant carried three fellow-employees in his
automobile; namely, Mr. Jensen, Mr. Gull and Mr. Williams.
The above is a complete resume of the entire testimony of the plaintiff's case with relation to his status as
an alleged passenger for hire.
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A~ the close of t~~ pl~intiff's ca.se, the defendant
moved for a dis1nissal· of the: actiQn on the ground that
the plaintiff had not produced evidence which would relieve the plaintiff from the provisions of Section 41-9-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, commonly called "The Guest
Statute," and the motion, with no argument permitted,
was taken under advise1nent and later, of course, denied.

During the def~ndant's case, in chief, the defendant again testified (Tr. 153-154). , His testimony, however, added nothing to what had previously been testified.
It will be noted that no where· in plaintiff's evidence
did he deem it necessary to even advise the Court of ·the
distance travelletl. by the plaintiff in defendant's car·each
day, this fact being material for the obvious reason that
for example, 70c for it trip of 100 niiles would bear a different analysis than a trip of 10 miles.·
Nowhere did plaintiff deem it necessary to inqUire
into the actual cost of the transportation, although this
information could have been readily available before trial
through the -discovery procedures provided in the Utah
Rules· of Civil Procedure; and at the trial, could have
been determined by the simple expediency of asking the
defendant while he was on the stand.
The plaintiff's ca~~, boiled down to its basic elements,
simply is this: that the plaintiff paid to defendant, his
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fellow-employee, 70c per day for a round t:rip ·transportation to and from employ1nent, an undisclosed distance,
the rides to be five times a week, but the expenses of
operating the car are not disclosed; that the above evidence sustains the burden ·of proof showing that the defendant was commi-tting a Misdemeanor, in violation of
54-6-12 (h), supra, page·8.
vVe feel certain, quite to the contrary, that the plaintiff wholly failed to sustain the burden of proof, and that
the Honorable Court below erred in denying plaintiff's
motion for a dislJlissal of th~ action.
In the. event that· plaintiff. feels, ·h~wever", that natu.ral
infe:t;ences.can be drawn in light with th.e plaintiff's testimony and evidence, coupled with facts based on common
those inference.s and
knowledge, we, too, gladly. ar~ive
conclusions.

at

This distance from Salt Lake City to Hill Air F·orce
Base near Ogden, Utah, is definite and not subject to
dispute. The State of Utah Road Commission publication, Appendix B, shows it to be 25.3 miles (by adding
the distances note d on the :q1ap), the measurement from
Salt Lake City starting at the Brigham Young Monument
at South Temple Street and Main Street. The plaintiff
resided at 456 East 13th South Street (Tr. 69), or 13
blocks south and 4¥2 blocks east of the Monument, total
blocks, 17th. It is common knowledge that there are eight
Salt Lake City blocks to the mile.
1
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By simple arithmetic, therefore, an accurate computation of the distance traveled from the plaintiff's home
to work and return can be determined as follows:
Official miles to Hill Fieid-25.3
Round trip ----------··············-········-··-···········50.6 Mi.
Additional distance, plaintiff's home to
Monument, round trip-35 blocks,
divided by 8 (blocks to mile)................ 4.4 Mi.
Total miles per day.......................... 55 Mi.
It can, therefore, be properly inferred from the
above that the plaintiff was paying 70c per day for at
least 55 miles transportation in def,endant's automo!bile,
or 1.3c per mile. If we assume that each occupant in the
defendant's car contributed the same amount; the total
'contribution would be equal to 5.2c per mile, and the
defendant would be contribut.ing one-fourth of that sum
towards the expense of opBrating his own vehicle.
Or, if we give the plaintiff more than a benefit of
the doubt, and assume that the entire distance, from his
home to Hill Field was only 25 miles, or 50 miles round
trip, the 70c per day contribution by him amounted to
1.4c per mile. On this again, if all the occupants contri·
buted the same amount, a total of 5.6c per mile would be
contribute(}, one-fourth of which the defendant would be
paying. And if the expenses of the transportation actu·
ally exceeded that amount, the defendant, of cours·e,
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would have to pay all the additional expense, as well
as the one-fourth mentioned.
'rhe plaintiff contends, and the Honorable District
Court has agreed as a matter of law, that the plaintiff,
under the above facts, gave ''compensation" to the defendant for his rides, within the meaning of the Guest
and :Motor Vehicle Transportation Acts (supra, page
7), and that the plaintiff sustained the burden of proof
to show that the arrangement between the parties was not
merely a convenient method for sharing the actual expenses.
It is so well known that the Court can take judicial
notice of the fact that a modern automobile cannot possibly be operated as economically as 5c per mile-not in
these times of 30c gasoline, 45c oil, $1.'50 lubrication,
$20.00 to $30.00 tires, coupled with the increased cost of
repairs, insurance, and rapid depreciation of originally
high priced automobiles. But in ord~r to believe that the
defendant, under this arrangement, was receiving "compensation'' it would have to be ruled, as a matter of law,
that the defendant's vehicle could be operated at a substantially lower amount than 5c per mile, in which event
the defendant was charging the plaintiff and his two
other fellow-employees more than their share of the actual expenses. Such a contention would, in our opinion,
be ridiculous.

Again we state, that to agree with the contention of
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the plaintiff, and the rulings of the Court below, would
be to agree that the Legislature intended to restrict and
prohibit the employee-driver from bargaining with fellow-employee riders for a profit, ("compensation");
limit him to. ac~epti:rig from each employe~~-r~der his pr~
rata share of. the actual expel1'Ses of the .transportation;
insi~t that the drive-r also pay his share of the expenses
of his own vehicie ; but. at the same_ time impose _upon the
employee-driver the increased liability of a person. actUrally operating a vehicle fo_r hire.
There is, of course, a vast maze of opinions from
other jurisdictions, interpreting the local Guest Statute·s
in light with the innumerable fact situations which have
been presented.
-An attempt here: to reconcile the. apparent conf1ict
in the decisions, in our: opinion, woUld be· both futil"e and
unnecessary." .In' out· se-arch of the_ precedents, we ·h.aye
~

~

found ~<? "cas'e from ariy -'j~ri~dictiori. _w)lerein' ~ s~tute,
even.· -~~mil~r Eo-

o~r 5_4-6~12 _<:h). uc_~, 1_9-5.3, has even be~n

mentioned.
Furthermore; the cases inyolving -fellow-employees,
sharing expenses for the transportation to and from
work, are surprisingly fewin.comP'aris'On. But even these
cases could not possibly be controlling or of interest to
this Court, unless, in those cases, the Court was also
interpreting a similar sta~ute ..
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.. _But despite the c.onfli~ting decisions, the Courts are
quite uniform ·in thei~ holdings concerning the general
principles of law which govern, the conflict being in the
interpretation of those principles in light with the facts
of eac~ case. These gen~r~l principles can be classified
a~ follows:
1.

THE MERE SHARING OF EXPENSES ALONE IS
NOT ENOUGH, OF ITSELF, TO ESTABLISH
THE RIDER AS A PASSENGER FOR HIRE,
RATHER THAN A GUEST.

The Utah SuJ?reme Court, in DERRICK vs. SALT
LAKE AND 0. RY. CO., 168 Pac. 335, while not interpreting the Guest Statute, which of course was not then
enacted, has recognized the above principle. In that case,
Merritt, the driver, accompanied by two other salesmen,
plaintiff and· one Leggett, were en route from Salt Lake
City to Ogden, Utah. .The t~ree -~en had previously
agreed to each pay his share of the ..actua1 expenses of the
trip, and during the trip, the car was struck by a train,
and the plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant railroad. Th~ three salesmen represented different companies, and the lower court held
that the relationship of carrier .and passenger existed
bet\veen the driver and his passenger~.
On these ·almost identical facts to the· case at bar.
the Utah Supreme Court states>at page 337 :_· .
.

-.

"The (lower) Court ... charged (the jury) ·on
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the theory that the relation of carrier and passenger existed between Merritt (driver) and the
plaintiff. This was error."
The Supreme Court then held that the parties were
joint adventurers and the balance of the decision is inapplicable to the case at bar, as there was no issue in the
plaedings, or at the trial on this theory.
The above ruling of this Court has never b'een overruled.
The following citations are also in accord:
RIGGS vs. ROBERTS, (Idaho) supra, page 15.
"The Oourts have quite uniformly held that
merely paying for gas and oil is not of itself and
alone sufficient to establish passenger status."
(Case's cited at '264 Pac. 2nd 700)
In McGANN vs. HOFFMAN, 70 Pac. 2d 909, at Page
912, the Court states :

"The great weight of authority is to the effect
that the sharing of the cost of gasoline and oil
consumed on a trip, when that trip is taken for
pleasure or social purposes, is nothing more than
the exchange of social amenities and does not
transform into a passenger one who without such
e·xchange would be a guest, and consequently is
not payment for the transportation or compensa-
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tion within the meaning of the Statute. It is obvious that if a different result obtained under any
construction of the Statute, its purposes would be
defeated and its e,ffect annulled. The relationships
which will give rise to the status of a passenger
must confer a benefit of a tangible nature and
are limited."
In OLEFSlCY vs. LUDWIG, (NY) 272 NYS 158 in
construing the Connecticut Statute, held that as a matter
of law contribution to the expenses of gasoline, oil, and
garage does not constitute payment within the meaning
of that Statute.
In VOELKEL vs. LATIN (Ohio) 16 NE 2 519:
"The guest statute should not be rendered
practically void by holding that a contribution to
common expenses of friendly parties made those
so contributing exempt from its effect."
In Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Vol. 4, Part 1, Sec. 2292 at Page 318:
"The mere sharing of expenses has been held
not to constitute the giving of compensation within
the meaning of the Statute, and the fact that the
rider pays part of the expenses of the trip does
not necessarily prevent him from being regarded
as a guest."
In 5 Amer. Juris.-Automobiles (Pocket Parts) Sec.
239 at Page 99:
''The mere fact that the owner or operator
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of the car receives 1noney as a result of carrying
the plaintiff does not necessarily entitle the plaintiff to the status of a passenger for hire, if the
1noney is not received as compensation for the
transportation, and the transportation was not induced by the expectation of such cash payment."
Therefore, if in the case at bar, the defendant sought
only to secure from the plaintiff for the transportation,
the plaintiff's share of the actual expenses, which the law
presumes to be the case, and which the facts and the inferences drawn therefrmn clearly indicate, then the
money was not received as compensation and the transportation was not "induced by the expectation of such."
2.

TO CONSTITUTE "COMPENSATION" THE ·CONTRIBUTION FROM THE RIDER TO THE DRIVER MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE.

"The authorities· are likewise quite uniform
to the effect that to constitute one a passenger,
not a guest ... there must be contributed by the
passenger to the driver of the car something substantial and of worth to the driver, i.e., commercial, not mere courtesy . . . In other words, the
driver must be actuated by a benefit of substantial
value ... to make the rider a passenger." Riggs
vs. Roberts (Supra, page 15).
In ALBRE'CHT vs. SAFEWAY STORES (Ore.) 80
Pac. 2nd 62, the Court states that the test is "whether
some substantial benefit has been conferred upon the
owner or operator of the motor vehicle as compensation
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for the transportation. If there was, the person being
transported is not a guest.''
HASBROOK_ vs. \VINGATE, (Ohio) supra, page 15.
"The general rule is that if the transportation
of a rider confers a benefit only on the person to
whom the ride is given and no benefits other than
such as are incidental to hospitality, good will, or
the like on the person furnishing the transportation, the rider is a guest.... "
Apparently plaintiff contends that his arrangement
with the defendant was a cold business proposition, and
not in the nature of friendship or courtesy. It is true that
the parties did not know each other before they arranged
for the plaintiff to ride. But isn't it just as logical to also
assume that there is a fraternity of fellowship among
fellow workers who have common problems of empl'OYment, transportation, and the like. Isn't it true that this
is brought out by the very fact that at the first meeting
of these parties, not one word was spoken about the cost
to plaintiff of the transportation; that the defendant in
fact accepted 20c less per day from the plaintiff than
plaintiff had paid previously. That certainly would
tend to indicate that the defendant was not attempting to
get "all that the traffic would bear" fr,om his riders.
Further, the fact that the Legislature has placed its
stamp of approval on the arrangement clearly indicates
that Public Policy, in this State, where there are several
Defense Establishments, as well as huge copper, steel and
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mining corporations, is in favor of assisting the en1ployees in economically and conveniently getting to and from
their employment.
3.

THE RIDER IS DEEMED A GUEST UNLESS
THERE WAS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES CLEARLY INDICATING TO THE PARTIES THAT THE RIDER WAS A PASSENGER,
AND THAT THE DRIVER KNEW, OR SHOULD
HAVE KNOWN, THAT HIS LIABILITY TO THE
RIDER ENTAILS THAT OWING TO A PASSENGER FOR HIRE.

HASBROOK vs. WINGATE (Ohio) 10 ALR 21342
at Page 134'5:
"The Ohio Guest Act and similar acts in other
states were undoubtedly enacted to carry out a
policy of social equity to the effect that the owner
or operator of an automobile should not be made
liable to a guest riding therein to whom the owner
or operator is doing a favor or is extending a
courtesy, except for wilful or wanton misconduct
on his part, and that a guest should assume the
risk of ordinary negligence or acts which are less
culpable than wilful or wanton mis·conduct. That
being the spirit of the enactment, the motorist
sh01dd be ac'C'orded the status which incurs the
lesser liability umless his status is clearly and
definitely changed by express consent or by facts
constituting acquiescenc;e on his p:art to a status
which entails the greater liability."
RIGGS vs. ROBERTS, (Idaho) supra, page 15:
"The authorities indicate there must be a mu"
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tual understanding reasonably clear to both the
rider and the driver before the trip is undertaken,
that the rider's relationship to the driver is that of
a passenger and not a mere guest."
Again, in the case at bar, can it be said that the
defendant, in compliance with the statute that permits the
carrying of feHow-employees to and from work, would
be deemed, as a matter of law, to understand that in so
complying, he was placing himself in a position of practically insuring the safety of his riders, the same as if he
flaunted the law, and charged each rider $5.00 per day,
carried 10 passengers and operated two or more automobiles in violation of the Statute? The answer, of
course, is obvious. Quite the contrary, he would certainly
assume, and be correct, that a'S long as he drove his car
within the intent and meaning of the statutory exception,
his liability to the o~cupants would not be increased over
his liability to any other guest.
The above three general principles of law, therefore,
read in light with the statutes of this state heretofore
cited and discussed, strongly and definitely are in accord
with the defendant's contention here, that the plaintiff
was a guest occupant in the defendant's automobile at
the time of the accident, and that the plaintiff failed to
establish at the trial that he was a passenger for hire.
Another clear indication of the intent of the Legislature is found in The Pocke,t Supplement Volume 6,
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U.C.A., 1953, following 54-6-12 (h), which contains a new
provision requiring those vehicles in the '•exempt classes"
which are operated for hire to carry liability insurance on
the rell icl c for hire. A reading of the Title to this Act,
Laws of 1- tah, 1953 at page 242, as well as the text, definitely shows that the employee-drivers, under subsection
(h) are not required to carry this insurance, as the legislature did not classify the1n as operating a vehicle for
hire.

"An Act Amending Sections 54-6-12 and 54-617, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Regarding Safety
And Inspection of Motor Vehicles, Reporting of
Accidents, Providing For Public Liability And
Property Damage Insurance, And Elimination of
Cargo Insurance For Contract Motor Carriers
For Hire."
It shall be unlawful for any vehicle which is
operated under any of said exempt classes to be
operated upon the public highways of this state,
for hire; without a public liability policy (in certain amounts) for liability arising out of the operation of said vehicle fo·r hire; ... or, to be operated for any us·es or purposes not falling within
said exempt classes, except in accordance with the
prorvisions of this act."
Now, certainly it cannot be contended that the Legislature having specifically restricted the employee-driver
from charging his riders a fare, at the same ti1ne meant
to designate his vehicle a "vehicle for hire." The Legislature could not have intended such a contradictory thing.
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They most certainly would have left the words "for compensation" in the original H.B. No. 1 and not specifically
stricken those words for the present phrase, "sharing
the actual expenses of the transportation."
The new insurance requirement applies only to those
classes in the "exempt classes" which are in fact ''vehicles
for hire," such as class (g) which includes taxis, ambulances, etc. It does not and could not apply with relation
to those classes which were not deemed to constitute "vehicles for hire," such a·s class (d), vehicles of an Agricultural Cooperative Association, being used in its non
profit activities; or class (e), vehicles owned and operated by the United States, or the State of Utah.
The insurance requirement could not possibly, therefore apply to class (h) as the very wording of that subsection prohibits the employee-driver from charging more
than the occupant's actual share of the cost.
\Ve have discussed the insurance requirement for a
reason other than to point out the above intent of the
Legislature. The other reason is to call the Court's attention to a very definite "trap" into which the thousands
of employee-drivers in this state have fallen, should the
Court reject the defendant's contention here.
It is common knowledge that the standard liability
policy issued by all companies on private passenger vehicles carries the exclusion declaring the policy void
if the vehicle is used a:s a "public or livery conveyance."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
If, then, the employee-driver has fully con1plied with
the provisions of 54-6-12 (h); has secured the standard
liability insurance policy; has not paid the greatly increased premium necessary for a vehicle for hire (there
being no legal requirement that he do so) ; and should
the Court now hold that he has, under the intent and
meaning of the above statute, in fact been operating a
vehicle for hire, the employee-driver is without insurance
protection completely. And this, even though he has
scrupulously complied with every portion of the law.
If the Legislature meant such an interpretation, they
would most certainly have permitted the employe€s in
class (h) to carry passengers for compensation, and
would not have stricken "compensation" from the Act.
'It is therefore clear and without doubt, that the
plaintiff wholly failed to sustain the burden of proof
necessary to relieve hi1nself of the provisions of the
Guest Statute, and that the Honorabl€ District Court
erred in denying defendant''S Motion for dismissal of the
action at the close of plaintiff's case, and in further refusing to direct a verdict in favor of defendant at the
close of all the evidence.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that defendant 1s entitled, in justice, to a reversal of the judgment,
and an entry of judgment in his favor, No cause of
Action.
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POINT II
ASSUMING THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING
THE DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT, THE PLAINTIFF, ON
THOSE SAME FINDINGS WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THE JURY'S VERDICT
TO THE CONTRARY WAS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.

The plaintiff having prevailed at the trial, we must,
of course, consider the evidence with relation to the
question of defendant's negligence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
WEENIG BROS. v. MANNING (Utah) 262 P.
2d at 492;
GIBBS v. BLUE CAB, INC. (Utah) 249 P. 2d 213.
With that test in mind, we summarize the favorable
evidence to plaintiff.
The fog was very thick, and the accident occurred
1n total darkness. On this the evidence was clear, the
only variance in the testimony being as to the distance
the defendant could see ahead.
The plaintiff testified (Tr. 72) that when he entered
the car it was foggy, and this was confirmed by the testimony of the other witnesses. Officer Grant ( Tr. 16) "It was a very heavy fog that morning."; Officer Evans
(Tr. 44) - " ... it was very, very thick that morning.
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I have seen it a little thicker, but not 1nany times.";
\Vitness Gull (Tr. 102) ~"The visibility was very bad";
Witness Everley (Tr. 109) -"It was thick. You didn't
even know you were by Slim Olsen's until you got underneath the lights . . . . It was a dense f'og"; Witness
Williams (Tr .120) -"It was very foggy. I think it was
extremely foggy"; Witness Reynolds ( Tr. 149) - "It
was very d.ense"; Witness Owens (Tr. 138) - "It was
very foggy."
As to visibility through the fog, the testimony varied
as follows:
Officer Grant (Tr. Hi) - "approximately one hundred feet"; Officer Evans (Tr. 40) - "Somewhere in
the neighborhood of 100 feet; maybe slightly less, maybe
a little more in places."; Witness Gull (Tr. 102) - "I
could see a short distance ahead and down along the side
of the road."; Witness WilHams (Tr. 120) - "on the
highway, I think we could see 40 to 50 feet"; Witness
Everley (Tr. 109) :-"I would say 50 to 75 feet"; Defendant l\1:ower (Tr. 156) -"I would estimate 75 to 100
feet. ... "; Wit~ess R,eynolds (Tr. 147) -"I would say
50 feet"; Witness Owens (Tr. 139) - "75 to 100 feet".
The speed of defendant's car was indicated as follows:
The plaintiff testified (Tr. 75) -"Well, I couldn't
see the speedometer, but I assume we was going close,
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right around 40 miles per hour . . . . I just had that
opinion"; vVitness Gull (Tr.117) -"Theway I had it in
mind was somewhere around 40 lliiles a11 hour; that is
between 35 and 40"; Witness Williams (Tr. 123) - " I
looked at the speedometer. I was frankly nervous, and
it showed 39 miles an hour."
The appearance of the roadway, whether it appeared
icy or dry, was at issue. rrhe testimony was very contradictory, but the foUowing witnesses testified that the
road appeared icy:
Officer Grant (Tr. 15) in answer to the question,
"and how could you tell" (the road was icy), answerecl
"By looking at the roadway. There was a glare on the
roadway that was normally absent on a dry road"; Officer Evans ( Tr. -!~)) ..,.- "I knew the road was slick because
when I came onto the highway it appeared to be slick";
Witness Williams (rrr. 12'2) - "Well, it was a wd fog
and did look slippery".
Despite the fact that witnesses Gull (Tr. 104); Everley (who said the road appeared wet) (Tr. 110 and 112);
Witness Owens (Tr. 139·-140); Witness Reynolds (Tr.
146-147), as weB as the defendant, all testified the roadway appeared dry, we will assume for the purpose of this
argument only that the above testimony apparently would
be sufficient for the jury to find that the appearance
was that of an icy roadway.
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As to the windows of the car, and particularly with
relation to the accun1ulation of fog on the windshield, the
testin1ony, favorable to the plaintiff and adverse to the
defendant, was as follows:
\Vitness Williams (Tr. 120) - "the windshield was
fogged up"; (Tr. 121) - "up towards the Farmington
Underpass it (right windshield) was quite foggy. . . .
There was very little heat and just a sma:ll opening (
the left windshield) about one foot in diameter . . . kind
of an oval opening" ; ( Tr. 127)

m

Q. "The right side was worse than the

left~"

A.
"Yes. I don't think it (the defroster) was working, hecause the other side was completely fogged up. A lot of
(the fog) was on the inside and some of it on the outside.
. . . There was frozen fog on the outside." (Tr. 129)
"Through the small opening (in the left windshield) it
was clear.''
The plaintiff confirmed the above condition of the
windshield, and testified the other windows were completely fogged up. (Tr. 74) -"They were getting pretty
well fogged up by that time· (When the car reached :Mr.
Williams' house). The (windshield) was getting dim
where it was hard to see through the windshield. As we
continued to go north, the windows frosted up more."
( Tr. 75) Q. "And could you see out of the windshield
in front of Mr. Gull~" A. "No, I was pretty well blocked
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from any side." Q. ''could you see over to the left of
the windshield by Mr. :Mower~" A." Very little. . . . You
can't fix to judge the speed if you can't see out."
On cross-examination (rrr. 86) plaintiff testified,
"Wouldn't anybody have a fear in their heart if they
couldn't see out and going, riding in the car~" Q. "And
the windows were so fogged you couldn't see out~" A.
"Yes."
(Tr. 89) Q. """\Vell, then will you please tell us, Mr.
Jensen, why you were uneasy in the car~" A. "Well, I
just think it was on account of me being in the dark and
going. I think anyone W 0uld be."
1

Q.

"You mean in the back seat, where you couldn't
A. "Yes." (Tr. 90) Q. "And you couldn't even see
a thing through the right half of the windshield~" A.
"No."
see~"

Q. "Now isn't it true that the left half of the windshield was clear~" A. "Not very much of it ... there
was fog on the left hand side, but it wasn't all fogged up."
(Tr. 93) " ... It was just like going somewhere in th~
dark."
On the question of defendant's negligence, therefore,
the jury must have found that the defendant was driving
in a heavy, thick fog in the nighttime (of which plaintiff,
of course, was well aware); that defendant's speed was
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40 ~LPII (the opinion of the plaintiff at the time) ; that
the visibility through the fog was not over 50 to 100
feet (which the plaintiff also knew); that the roadway
appeared icy (the plaintiff at least having knowledge of
this possibility as he testified (at Tr. 85) that he felt the
ear ~kid in front of l\lr. William's home) ; that the right
windshield was cmnpletely fogged up, and that there was
only a ~mall opening in the left windshield, through which
the plaintiff, and therefore the defendant, could see
''Very little."
l 7 nder these conditions pl:aintiff made no protest
whatsoever, nor did he request the defendant, at any
time, to slow down, stop and clear his windows, or, in fact,
n1ake any indication to the defendant that he, the plaintiff, was in any way worried by the manner of the defendant's driving, or the lack of visibility from inside the
car.

':l"'·he plaintiff testified (Tr. 91) :

"Q.

A.

Q.

Now as you reached the Farmington Underpass and when the passengers were alleged to
have made these statements, did you say
anything to him?
No.
Did you at the ti1ne feel that it was getting
dangerous~

A.

Well, I did, but I put my trust in him and I
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don't think it's right for all drivers to advise
the driver.

Q.

If you felt that you might get injured, don't
you feel that you would be justified in asking
Mr. Mower if he wouldn't mind slowing down
or cleaning his windshield, or something t

A.

Yes.

Q.

But you don't like to be a back seat driver?

A.

That's right.

Q.

So that you decided that you would just take
the gamble and hope that you made it?

A.

That's right."

The remarks made to the defendant by the other
drivers could have hardly been sufficient to replace plaintiff's own objection to the very dangerous situation which
the jury apparently decided prevailed. Those remarks
were made by l\1 r. Gull, riding in the front seat, and ~fr.
Williams, in the rear seat, the testimony of these witnesses being:
Mr. Gull: (Tr. 101)
"Well, all I can recollect of that is I told
Frank, I said, 'My side is getting fogged up.
Can you see out of yours~' I remember Frank
saying, 'Yes, I can see out of mine.',.
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Mr. Williams: (Tr. 123)
"I remarked, and I hated to, I don't like to
be a back se~at driver. I remarked something
like, 'Aren't we going a little fast 1'

Q. And what did Mr. Mower say, if
A.

anything~"

I don't recall. I don't believe he answered
unless he just said, 'Yeah,' or something like
that.

Q. And did he make any change in the speed of
the car1
A.

He may have dropped down some.''

At T'r. 1'2·5, the witness testified:
"He dropped it (his speed) a little ... I would
say 2 or 3 miles per hour and then I think he went
back up from there."
The above conversations took place at the Farmington Underpass, or about two miles from the scene of the
accident.
Certainly the remarks made by the other riders did
not have a noticeable and immediate effect upon the manner in which the defendant was driving, and the condition of the fogged windshields and the side windows was
certainly not improved. Yet despite the lack of any immediate response from the defendant to the remarks
made, the plaintiff made no statement whatsoever, but in-
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stead, as he ad1nitted on the stand, he decided to take tl1e
gamble and hope that he made it.
The plaintiff admitted that he had a ''fear in his
heart"; that he was "intense"; that he felt that the situation was dangerous.
Under those conditions the normal, prudent rider,
in order to protect hilnself from the danger which was so
apparent most certainly would and should have protested,
or at least strongly requested the driver to slow up, or
to stop and clear his windshield.
The half-hearted remarks made by the other riders,
with no immediate result upon the defendant, cannot substitute for a more vigorous protest frorn the plaintiff,
which, in all probability, would have had the desired response from the driver. But without some effort on the
plaintiff's part to lessen the dangerous situation, he cannot now be heard to complain that the gamble which he
took, a calculated risk, failed.
Furthermore, there was ample testimony that moisture inside the vehicle collected upon the windshield and
the other windows during this cold, freezing morning.
The plaintiff was so concerned with his own comfort
that he did not roll the window down to air out the interior, and free the inside of the glass of" fog", because
(Tr. 86) "it was too cold."
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The plaintiff contended that he was a paying passenger in defendant's automobile. The authorities are
clear that even if he were, he is under a duty to use reasonable precautions for his own safety.
4 BLASHFIELD, CYC. OF AUTO. LAW AND
PRA'CTICE, SEC. 2217, at Page 2217, in discussing pas~en,ger~ in taxicabs, stated:
"While the primary duty to care for the safety
of passengers rests upon the driver of a taxicab,
a passenger being under no duty, except in exceptional cases, to be on the lookout for possible
dangers, yet circumstances may arise which are
such as to impose such a duty on the passenger
in order for his conduct to conform to that of a
reasonably prudent person. While the n1ere speed
at which a taxicab is driven is ordinarily not a
matter with which a passenger may need concern
himself, yet, if it is driven at a speed dangerous
under all the circun1stances or dangerous under
the particular circumstances, and the passenger
has an opportunity to protect against the speed,
his failure to do so may prevent his recovery for
an injury resulting fro~m the excessive speed, if
an ordinarily prudent person, under the circumstances, would have cautioned the driver."
In GARRO'V v. SEATTLE TAXI'CAB CO. - 135
WASH. 630,238 P. 623, the Court states:
" .... if the automobile be driven at a speed
dangerous under all the circumstances, or dangerous under the particular circumstances, and the
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passenger had an opportunity to warn or protect
against the speed and failed so to do, clearly he
could not recover against the owner for an injury
resulting from the excessive speed .... it is not
rea.sonable prudence for one to remniu ]Jatssit'e
while another negligently subjects him to an 7f·nnecessary danger, when ,an opportnnity to act is
present."
In CAPERON v. TUTTLE (UTAH) 11G P2d 402,
the facts were that plaintiff, a guest in defendant's car,
was riding in the rear seat when he saw sheep on the
road ahead and cried out a warning about the same time
that defendant applied his brakes. This Court stated at
Page 405:
"As we have heretofore stated, any negligence
of the driver was not imputable to his guest.
Nevertheless, if the jury found that the driver was
negligent, it could . . . have considered whether
or not (plaintiff) was, or should have been, aware
of such negligence and was, therefore, under a
duty to warn said driver of the danger involved
and endeavor to influence him to exercise greater
caution, and further, whether or not anything that
plaintiff might have done would have influenced
the driver to greater care and thus have avoided
the accident."
GILMAN v. OLSON, 125 OR.1, 265 P439; COWAN
v. SALT LAKE & 0. R. CO. 5G UTAH 94, 189 P. 599.
In the case at Bar, and again referring to the remarks made by witnesses Gull and Williams, the plain-
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tiff (at Tr. 75) testified:
"We went under the Underpass there by
Lagoon. I can remember of going under the Underpass. But before we went under the Underpass
I heard l\ir. Williams ask him if he wasn't going
too fast and he said no. And I seen him go under
the Underpass and then Mr. Gull said, afteT the
Underpass, that he couldn't see out of his side of
the windshield ... and Mr. l\{ower s·aid that he
could and kept a going. So I was just in·tense."
The Court: "So you were
A.

what~"

"Intense."

In answer to the question of Mr. Williams, "Aren't
we going a little fast~", Mr. Mower either made no reply,
or he said "yeah" or ''No". The witnesses' recollections
were not in accord.
But regardless of his reply, there was no noticeable
reaction from the driver, unless he dropped his speed
2 to 3 miles per hour, and then picked the ~peed back
up again, which Mr. Williams testified he "may" have
done.
In any event, the plaintiff himself believing the situation dangerous some two miles from the point of the
accident; knowing the atmospheric conditions; completely
unable to see out of the ear windows, except "very little"
throughout the left front windshield glass; himself of
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the opinion that the car was going 40 miles per hour;
and knowing from past experience that the roadway was
amptly wide enough to stop the car against the east edge
so that the windshields could he cleared, cannot, as a
reasonable and prudent person passively sit by and
gamble with his own safety.
Again in Blashfield, Vol. 4, Sec. 2414 at pages 563,564.

"It is a general rule, however, that the guest
will be considered to acquiesce in any course of
driving persisted in sufficiently long to give him
an opportunity to protest and thereby indicate his
dissent or disapproval of the manner of driving.
A passenger, even one who is a gratuitous guest,
in an automobile cannot sit idly by observe clear
violations of the law or a steady course of negligent conduct, in such ways, for example, as by the
operation of the vehicle at an excessive speed or
the like, and acquiesce therein and then be permitted to hold the operator or third persons liable
for the damage resulting fron1 such violation of
legal duty. As said by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana . . . the theory underlying this rule is
that of assent to and acquiescence in the driver's
negligence."
There is then cited by the text at note 59, page 570;
" ... a finding of the jury that plaintiff was
not negligent is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, where the collision occurred on a
dark, foggy and misty night, where the driver
of the car in which the plaintiff was riding testi-
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fied that he was dri,·ing between 1S and 20 miles
an hour, although he could not see more than 8 to
10 feet ahead, and where plaintiff who was
sitting beside the driver rnade no rernonstrance
or objection of any kind as to the speed at which
the automobile was being driven. l\icDermott v.
:McKeown Transp. Co., 263 Ill. App. 325."
The Utah Supreme Court, in IIillyard vs. l~tah ByProducts Co., 263 Pac. 2nd at page 289 has stated the
rule in this respect as follows:
"Ordinarily (the guest) has the right to
plaee smne reliance upon prudence, care and
skillfullness of the driver. It is only when the
guest knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care
should know that the driver lacked such qualities,
or is being careless that it becomes the guest's
duty to consider doing something about the operation of the car. In the Esernia case cited by
defendant, where such duty was recognized, the
passengers were fully aware of the sleepy condition of the driver; he had already run off the
road o.nce and had stated that he was so sleepy
that he didn't know whether he could keep awake,
after "·hich there had been ample opportunity
to leave the truck. Likewise in the case of l\iaybee
v. :Jr ayhet>, the plaintiff, whose mother was the
driver, knew of her mother's nearsightedness and
that she \Ya~ driving without glasses; so she was
fullv a ware of the serious defect in her mother's
ability to drive safely, yet she acquiesced in the
situation and abandoned the care of the car to
her rnother to such an extent that she was content
to read a book during the drive."
3

2. Esernia v. Overland :Moving Co., 115 Utah
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519, 206 P. 2nd 621.
3. 79 Utah ;)85, ll P :2nd 973.
See also Cowan v. Nalt Lake & U. Hy. Co. (Utah)
189 Pac. 605.
It is therefore submitted ,that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law; he ac<tuiesced
in the manner in which the defendant was driving under
the very dangerous conditions which the jury found existed; he made no protest or suggestion to the defendant
whatsoever, although he had ample opportunity to do so
inasmuch as the dangerous circumstances existed miles
before the accident occurred.

The jury's finding that plaintiff was free of negligence was clearly against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12 INVADED
THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY, AND WAS REVERSIBLE
ERROR.

Instruction No. 12 was as follows:
"You are instructed that if you believe from
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant,
Frank Mower, knew or should have known that
he was traveling on icy roads, then if you further
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find that a person under the circumstances of this
case would not as a reasonable and prudent man,
have applied his brakes, then you shall find that in
so doing he was negligent."
The Court, b;· this instruction, assumed the following
facts, which were at issue :
1.

'rhat the defendant applied his brakes before the

car started skidding.
2. ~rhat the application of the brakes was negligently done, whether touched lightly to slow the speed of the
car, or jammed vigorously to stop.
3. That the application of the brakes, regardless of
how applied, was a proximate cause of the accident.
It ·was a jury question as to whether the defendant
actually applied his brakes; and if applied, whether they
were applied before or after the car started skidding.
It was a jury question as to whether the defendant negligently applied his brakes, it being the testimony of the defendant that, if he applied his brakes at all, he merely
"touched" his brakes, which we submit would not be
negligence in any event; and it was a jury question as to
whether the application of the brakes was a proximate
cause of the accident, it being the contention of the defendant that the car skidded on the solid ice surface priInarily fron1 the attempt to turn from one lane to the
other to avoid the stopped car ahead.
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At Tr. 159 the defendant testified:
''Well, I naturally wondered what 'vas in
front of n1e. I turned to the left and I guess I
touched my brakes and my right end just came on
around and cut the front end."
Again, on Cross Examination at Page 164:
"Well, as I discovered these tail lights were
stopped I naturally turned to the left and I
imagine I hit my brakes. I don't even remember
that I hit my brakes but my right end came
around."
At Page 168:
"Well, I imagine I was going about the same
speed as I was when I touched my brakes because
it didn't seem to slow up. The rear end just whipped right around."
On Re-Direct, at Page 173:
"Why I turned to the left to turn around him
and I naturally wanted to see what was in front
of him. I wanted to slow down and see if there
was something in front of him.... I had no idea
there was going to be an accident at that time ....
I just merely intended to turn around him and
slow down in case there was something in front of
him. . . . "
The Court's instruction, therefore, completely di~
regarded defendant's testimony. The jury had a right to
believe the defendant and to believe that the application
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of the brakes was either made after the car started skidding; that the defendant, even if he knew that the highway was icy, was not negligent in lightly "touching" the
brake pedal; and that the application of the brakes, in any
event,

wa~

not a proximate cause of the accident.

The highway patrol officer who testified at Tr. 29,
while reviewing his findings at the scene, based on his
oh~ervation

and inquiry of the drivers involved, stated:

"The 1947 Nash came along ... touched his
brakes, his car went into a skid, etc."
lt is co1nmon lmowledge that brakes on vehicles must
be used, even if the roadway is solid ice. The careful
driver applies his brakes under these circumstances by a
light application ··touching" and in a pumping action. It
is, of course, careless to ''jain" the brakes. But, whether
the defendant carefully ''touched" his brakes or "jammed" then1 in an effort to stop, was a vital question for
the jury.
The Court's instruction clearly stating that if the
jury should find that the defendant should have known
that the road was icy and applied his brakes, no matter
how he applies them, and regardless of whether he applied then1 before or after the car started skidding, the
defendant would then be negligent, was clearly error
prejudicial to the defendant.
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It is also common knowledge that the mere turning
of the front wheels on Rolid ice can and very frequently
does cause a car to skid, with no application of the brakes.
Plaintiff's own witness, Everley, testified (at Tr. 110)
that while he was following the gradual curve under the
Underpass at Farmington, he felt his car skid, but he was
able to right it and proceed. Until that time he thought
the road was wet but not slippery (Tr. 112). At any rate,
he certainly was not applying his brakes at the time his
car started skidding.
The defendant testified, as indicated above, that he
turned and then may have touched his brakes, but in any
event, the car started skidding immediately. The order
of his actions, however, was first, to turn to his left to
change lanes, and second, to touch his brakes to slow
down (if in fact he applied his brakes at all). The instruction completely took these· factors from the jury, by assuming that the negligent application of the brakes caused
the car to skid.
We, therefore, submit that the jury could have hardly
thought other than this:
The issue for the jury's determination was whether
the defendant knew or should have known that the road
was icy at the scene of the accident. If the jury found in
the affirmative, then the defendant was negligent, inasmuch as he applied his brakes negligently, which caused
the car to skid and collide with the stopped vehicle.
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\Ye further submit that even assuming that the defendant knew that the road was icy, the jury had a right
to find that the defendant's action in atten1pting to change
lanes, and lightly touching his brakes, for the purpose of
slowing the speed of his car until he could determine what
was ahead of the stopped car, was not negligence, and
that the defendant acted in those respects in accordance
with the actions of the reasonable and prudent motorist
under the circun1stances.
\V e believe the instruction was further erroneous in
that it did not state the alternative to the proposition
stated, and therefore over-accentuated the plaintiff's
theory of the case.
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the defendant is entitled to a reversal of the judg~ent, and a new trial.

POINT FOUR
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE PREJUDICIALLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY WERE CONTRADICTORY AND CONFUSING AND INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW.

The instructions to which we refer as contradictory
and confusing, and which incorrectly state the law applicable to the facts of the case at bar, are herewith quoted:
Instruction No. 8.
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You are instructed that it is negligent as a matter
of law for a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled public highway used by vehicles at such a rate of speed
tha.t said automobile cannot be stozJped 1uithin the distance at which the operator of the automobile is able to
see objects upon the li i.r;lnray in front of him.
Instruction No. 10 .

. . . In erery event the speed shall be so c:onirolled as
may be necessary to avoi.d collid:i,n.g with any person,
vehicle or other conveyance on the highway and the duty
of all persons to use due care.
Instruction No. 11.
It is the duty of the driver of a motor vehicle to be
diligent at all times, keeping a reasonable lookout for
possible danger to himself or others, and to keep the
motor vehicle he is driving under such control that to
avoid a collision he can stop a.s quickly as might be required of him by eventualities that would be anticipated
by an ordinary, prudent person in like position.

Tnstruction No. 12.
You are instructed that if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant, Frank Mower,
knew or should have known that he was traveling on icy
roads, and if you further find that a person under the
circumstances of this case would not as a reasonable and
prudent man have applied his brakes, then you shall find
that in so doing he was negligent.
Instruction No. 13.
You are instructed that if you believe from a pre-
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ponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Frank
1fower, could have passed to the left of the auton1obi!e
parked on the highway and he should ha,ve done so In
the exercise of due care of a reasonably prudent man
then you will find that he was negligent in failing to do
so.
In effect, therefore, the jury was instructed in Numbers S and 11 that the defendant was under a duty to
stop (with no mention made of "avoid") upon seeing a
vehicle ahead in his headlights, yet in Number 12 the jury
was instructed that if the defendant knew the road was
icy and atte1npted to stop by applying his brakes to stop,
he \vas negligent, if the reasonable prudent man would
not have applied his brakes, even in the slightest degree.
The jury, under those instructions, could well assume that
the la\Y requires a motorist, travelling on icy roads, to
travel at such a speed that he can stop without the application of brakes at all, or that if he does apply brakes,
he does so at his own risk, inasmuch as he will be deemed
negligent if an accident occurs, regardless of the circumstances.
Instruction No. 10 goes further by saying that "in
eL:ery event" the speed 1nust be controlled so as to avoid
an accident, even, we presume, if it be conceded that the
car with which the accident occurs is stopped blocking
traffic in violation of the law, or the other n1otorist is
operating his vehicle in a highly reckless manner. This
instruction, clearly stating that there are no exceptions
to the rule of law stated, is clearly contrary to the law
as stated by this Court, as indicated infra page ------·
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It is further confusing, and must have been so to the
jury, to be instructed, in Number 13, in effect that e'Ten
though the law requires the defendant to stop, if the defendant, as a reasonable man, cotdd have or shouid have
passed on the left of the stopped vehicle, and he failed
to do so, (which was obvious because of the fact that the
accident happened) then the defendant was negligent.
Instruction No. 13 was very prejudicial. It permitted the jury to determine by hindsight what was admitted
by the evidence, that there was sufficient room on the left
of the stopped car for the defendant's vehicle to pass.
If all that the jury had to determine was whether the defendant ''could" have passed, there would have been no
need for a law suit. Of course he ''could" have passed,
in the sense that it was not an impossibility to do so.
The instruction then, in effect, asks the jury whether the
defendant "should" have passed the car. Again, using
hindsight, there is no question that he'' should" have done
so, if for no other reason than it would have been highly
more desirable for everyone concerned that he do so.
Can any one say that he should have collided with the
car? There has never yet been an automobile accident
which should have happened, and we feel certain no jury
has ever yet so found.
The plaintiff will undoubtedly contend that the
Court's Instruction Number 17 (which was requested by
defendant) clarifies any confusion which might have been
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present in the n1inds of the jury. We believe Number 17
to correctly state the law, but the jury, after being instructed in N u1nbers 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13, could not help
but be further confused by Instruction Number 17. In
other words after having been told that, in effect, the
defendant is under the duty to stop, or that if there were
room enough to pass the stopped vehicle on its left and
he failed to do so he is negligent, with no exception, and
that "in any event" he rnust avoid an accident, then the
jury could not help but be confused by then being instructed, as in Nu1nber 17, that there are exceptions after
all.
In 53 Am. Juris. Trial, Sec. 557, page 442:
"Instructions as a whole must be consistent
and harmonious, not conflicting and contradictory.
This is true although one of the instructions correctly states the law as applicable to the facts of
the case, since the correct instruction cannot cure
the error in the contradictory, erroneous instruction. Inconsistent instructions are calculated to
n1islead and confuse the jury, since the jury are
thereby left in doubt and without any certain
guide as to the law arising upon the evidence."

vVe

submit that the Court's instructions were not
tailored to the fact situations present in this case. The
Court's instruction on the duty of a motorist to drive
at such a speed that he can stop within the distance of
his headlights would be entirely correct, if the accident
had occured on the normal two lane highway, one lane
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for each direction. A motorist on such a highway, of
course, must anticipate that he may encounter an object
ahead at the same time that an opposite bound car is
approaching, which may require a complete stop in order
to avoid a collision with the object ahead, as well as to
avoid a head-on collision with the opposite bound car.
But that situation was not present in the case at bar.
Here the defendant was proceeding north on a two
lane, one way hi.ghway, with no possibility at all of an
opposite bound car preventing the defendant from passing any object in the lane ahead.

It is common knowledge that a motorist can, with
little or no effort, move his vehicle from one lane to
another and pass an obstacle blocking the one lane, whereas it might, under the circumstances, be impossible and
unnecessary to completely stop behind that object.
To hold, however, even under these facts, that the
defendant nevertheless, is still under the duty to drive
at such a speed that he can completely stop behind a
vehicle which he suddenly observes illegally stopped in
the one lane ahead, would require a complete disregard
of the practical factors of driving at night.

In l\fOSS vs. CHRISTENSEN - GARDNER, INC.
(Utah) 98 Pac. 2nd at 367, Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion, states:
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"The instant decision conunendably departs
fron1 the severe logic of the Dalley case (Dalley v.
l\1:idwestern Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15
P. 2nd 309) in order to make the law comport not
w·ith logic but with realities-a very welcome
syn1ptom. The logic of the Dalley case would require that a driver blinded by lights stop until the
blindness disappears. There is in logic no more
reason why a man should proceed when unable
to see objects because of being blinded by the
lights of some other car than when unable to see
them by the lights of his own car. But as stated
in my dissenting opinion in Farrell v. Cameron,
94 P.2d 1068, some concession must be made to
actualities. In that case, the implication was that
a 1nan on his own side of the road blinded bv
oncon1ing lights was under a. duty to discover a~
oncoming person on the wrong side of the road.
Of course, such law would make driving at night
on much used arterials practically an impossibility."
\Ve sub1nit that the same reasoning applies to the
case at bar. A 1notorist, even in fog, is entitled to proceed
in hi:-: lawful use of the highway. That motorist, with
the knowledge that he is using a wide, two lane, one way
thoroughfare, with no possibility of opposite bound cars,
is not negligent if he drives at a speed which would
pennit hin1 to aroid, by passing, an object stopped in
the lane ahead; and this, even though he were unable to
actuall:· stop within the sa1ne distance which permitted
a safe passing.
For example, Blashfield Cycl. of Auto. Law and
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Practice, Yol. 1, Part 2, Page G95, Sec. 751, it is stated:
"Suppose a motorist is traveling at the rate
of 40 miles an hour. At that speed, allowing for
for the three-fourths of a second that is required
for the average driver to react to a warning, an
automobile with brakes in excellent condition can
be stopped in 115 feet. If the headlights reveal an
object just 115 feet ahead, then the motorist is
traveling within the radius of his lights, and is
able to avoid a collision, provided that when the
object is first discerned the surrounding circumstances suggest danger, and the need for an
emergency stop. If a second passes before the
motorist perceives indications of danger, and a
''stop" signal flashes to his brain, the automobile
during that second has travelled 59 feet. The
object is then only 56 feet away, and it is too late
to stop, and may be too late even to swerve so as
to avoid a collision, since the actual stopping distance at 40 miles per hour is 71 feet."
The defendant in the case at bar testified that when
he realized that the car ahead was stopped, it wa~ I;) to
100 feet distant. The three-fourths second lapse before
defendant could react \vould result in the car travelling
4-±.25 feet. The defendant, therefore, had 30.75 to 55.75
feet to stop or t11rn and pass the vehicle ahead. Quite
obviously, the defendant could not possibly have stopped,
and indeed there was no need for him to do so, as there
was a lane of travel wide open on his left. It is submitted
that in that distance, under conditions which prevailed,
the jury could properly have determined that the defendant was not negligent merely because of the fact that
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his automobile skidded. (Yol. 1 Blashfield, Cyc. Auto.
La'" & Practice, page 680, sec. 749); nor that he was
driving too fast under the conditions; nor that he was
keeping an ilnproper lookout.
But the jury having been instructed, in Instructions
No. 8 and 11, that the law requires that the motorist be
able to stop within the distance objects ahead can be
seen, with no 1nention in those same instructions concerning the n1otorist's ability to avoid the said object,
was certainly n1isleading and did not properly state the
law applicable tn this case, and made it incumbent on
the jury to find the defendant negligent.
For the above reasons, the instructions were prejudicially erroneous.
Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS E. MIDGLEY,
Attorney for Defendant

and Appellant.
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